Abstract: This paper presents a multiperiod electricity auction market tool that explicitly takes into account transmission congestion and losses as well as intertemporal operating constraints, such as start-up costs, ramp rates, and minimum up and down times that may be included in any generating unit's composite bid. This approach, which requires only existing mixed-integer linear solvers, provides the market operator with a valuable tool for scheduling participants in a competitive market where transparency, fairness, and confidentiality of participants' data are of paramount concem. Under this framework, only network data is of public domain; producers are not required to reveal corporate data, and they have more flexibility in specifying the structure of their composite bid. This paper demonstrates and illustrates through numerical studies using test systems that an efficient and fair competitive electricity market can be implemented taking into account network constraints and losses.
Abstract: An algorithm that allows a market participant to maximize its individual welfare in electricity spot markets is presented. The use of the algorithm in determining market equilibrium points, called Nash equilibria, is demonstrated. The start of the algorithm is a spot market model that uses the optimal power flow (OPF), with a full representation of the transmission system and inclusion of consumer bidding. The algorithm utilizes price and dispatch sensitivities available from the Hessian matrix and gradient of the OPF to help determine an optimal change in an individual's bid. The algorithm is shown to be successful in determining local welfare maxima, and the prospects for scaling the algorithm up to realistically sized systems are very good. Nash equilibria are investigated assuming all participants attempt to maximize their individual welfare. This is done by iteratively solving the individual welfare maximization algorithm until all individuals stop modifying their bids.
Keywords: Power systems, economics, welfare maximization, OPF, markets, Nash equilibrium. Abstract: We present a single time period decentralized electricity market clearing model that includes reactive power and demand responsiveness in addition to the more common framework of generation-side competition for the real power commodity. The approach allows self-interested agents, namely producers and consumers, independently to maximize their individual surpluses subject to prices. This is consistent with the notion of a competitive market as defined in equilibrium theory. An auctioneer computes equilibrium prices that achieve power balance at every network node, as required by Kirchhoff's laws. The overall scheme is justified by duality theory, for which there is a rich theoretical support, and convergence is achieved using a Newton price-updating algorithm.
Keywords: Auction, market coordination, market equilibrium, mathematical programming, optimization methods, power generation dispatch, power generation economics, power generation scheduling, power system economics. 
